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Economic  games  are  now  routinely  used  to  characterize  human  cognition  across  multiple
dimensions.  These  games  allow  for effective  computational  modeling  of  mental  function
because  they  typically  come  equipped  with  notions  of optimal  play,  which  provide  quan-
titatively  prescribed  target  functions  that  can be tracked  throughout  an  experiment.  The
combination  of these  games,  computational  models,  and  neuroimaging  tools  open  up the
possibility  for  new  ways  to characterize  normal  cognition  and  associated  brain  function.
We  propose  that  these  tools  may  also  be used  to  characterize  mental  dysfunction,  such  as
that found  in  a range  of  psychiatric  illnesses.  We  describe  early  efforts  using  a  multi-round
trust  game  to probe  brain  responses  associated  with  healthy  social  exchange  and  review
how this  game  has  provided  a  novel  and  useful  characterization  of  autism  spectrum  disor-
der.  Lastly,  we  use  the  multi-round  trust  game  as  an  example  to discuss  how  these  kinds  of
games  could  produce  novel  bases  for representing  healthy  behavior  and brain  function  and
thus  provide  objectively  identiﬁable  subtypes  within  a  broad  spectrum  of  mental  function.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
. Introduction
Theoretical approaches to the understanding of human decision-making (Von Neumann et al., 2007) have provided
n excellent framework for ongoing empirical investigations, which measure actual human behavior against theoretically
ptimal actions (Camerer, 2003). The ability to measure brain responses, particularly with the use of functional magnetic
esonance imaging (fMRI, Ogawa et al., 1990a, 1990b), associated with these behaviors has lead the development of biological
nvestigations into the relationship between human biology and (ir)rational decision making (Montague and Berns, 2002;
oewenstein et al., 2008). The early revelation that humans do not always act in accord with economic theory and the
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.bility to measure brain responses associated with these decisions are beginning to inform and reshape economic theories
bout human decision making (Camerer, 2003; Loewenstein et al., 2008). These developments are also giving rise to a
ew approach, i.e., computational psychiatry, to investigate mental disorders (Montague et al., 2012; Kishida et al., 2010);
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the motivation behind computational psychiatry is to generate objective, computationally framed depictions of unhealthy
behavior and brain function associated with the wide range of psychiatric illnesses.
Psychiatric illnesses are brain disorders that ‘reveal’ their symptoms through aberrant decision-making and personal
subjective turmoil. Unfortunately, the causes of these disorders have been extremely elusive; clinical and research efforts
have been and continue to be hindered by the challenges associated with determining objectively identiﬁable symptoms.
The use of computational approaches paired with game-theoretic probes and human neuroimaging promises to provide
insight into the processes underlying human decision-making. These developments have the potential of generating a whole
new perspective on the biological bases of human cognition and decision making by providing a novel entry point for the
investigation and discovery of the biological architecture underlying human behavior.
Game theoretic probes provide a powerful framework for studying socially interacting agents where the strategies
employed are guided by various concepts of optimal play. These games provide a natural landscape for the application
of computational approaches and theoretical frameworks (like computational reinforcement learning theory, Sutton and
Barto, 1998) to describe otherwise qualitative features of human experience like familiarity, fairness, or trust. Additionally,
these games provide a good experimental setting for exploring features in our social environments that guide our behav-
ior. Computational reinforcement learning theory (Sutton and Barto, 1998) provides a framework for investigating optimal
reward harvesting and adaptive behavior and can readily be integrated into multi-round social exchange games (King-Casas
et al., 2005). Reinforcement learning models capture notions of optimality in the context of decision-making in novel or
changing environments and are ﬂexible to what constitutes an agent, environment, and rewards. Within reinforcement
learning approaches is the concept of a policy, which maps states to actions in order to maximize value. The use of these
mathematical depictions of human behavior opens the door to new perspectives from which new dimensions of personality
(i.e., styles of decision making) and their biological correlates may  emerge. These quantitative depictions promise to be
useful for characterizing normal and dysfunctional human cognition (Kishida et al., 2010) and can provide a relevant basis
for identifying biological substrates important for human cognition at multiple levels of organization including social and
individual behavioral, neurobiological and genetic systems.
In this memorial tribute to John Dickhaut, we  focus on the use and development of the multi-round trust game (King-
Casas et al., 2005, 2008; Weigelt and Camerer, 1988; Tomlin et al., 2006; Chiu et al., 2008), which was related to his and
colleagues single round version of the game (Berg et al., 1995). We  review early results from the application of the multi-
round trust game and human neuroimaging to autism spectrum disorder. Additionally we describe the use of this game
to classify behavior expressed in other mental disorders, such as borderline personality disorder (King-Casas et al., 2008)
and depression (King-Casas et al., 2008; Koshelev et al., 2010). These early results suggest the ability to characterize human
behavior and associated neural processes along new dimensions.
2. The single round trust game (Berg et al., 1995)
Berg et al. (1995) employed a single round game to investigate trust during economic exchange. In the single round
trust game two  players engage anonymously; there is an “investor” (ﬁrst-mover) and a “trustee” (responder); the investor
is endowed with $10 and decides an amount to share with their partner; the sent amount (i.e., “investment”) is tripled on
its way to the trustee; the trustee then decides how much, if any, to reciprocate to the investor. In the execution of this
game the signals transmitted between the players is restricted to the money sent back and forth. As Berg et al., point out the
Nash equilibrium for this game is for no money to initially be sent by the investor since a rational and selﬁsh trustee will
keep any money sent their way, thus to maximize ones earnings the selﬁsh investor ought to keep everything. Contrary to
this prediction, trust (money sent to the trustee) is observed as is reciprocation (money sent back to the investor) and the
authors conclude that trust is likely a “behavioral primitive” (Berg et al., 1995) that maximize long-term genetic ﬁtness over
short-term gains through selﬁsh behavior. This interpretation of their results is drawn in contrast to games with repeated
interactions where trust can be learned or may  show varying degrees of stability. An important point about their conclusion is
the notion of a behavioral primitive; by expressing trust in a single interaction the results suggest that people carry around
within them a bias toward trust and reciprocity. The authors do not propose in detail where such a bias may be stored;
however, from a neurobiological perspective this bias must be engendered in the neural architecture both structurally and
functionally and can be measured using the right tools. For example, recent ﬁndings suggest a genetic basis for the behavior
expressed in this version of the game (Cesarini et al., 2008, 2009).
The single round trust game is also used by Berg et al. (1995) to investigate a “social history” manipulation wherein anony-
mous and naïve players are provided information about how previous participants played this game; this relatively mild
manipulation was observed to increase trust suggesting that learning mechanisms and narratives that modulate expectations
are also important in determining the expressed strategies.
Recent investigations employing fMRI have begun to investigate neural responses associated with the behavioral ges-
tures exchanged within a multi-round version of the trust game (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988; King-Casas et al., 2005, 2008;
Tomlin et al., 2006; Chiu et al., 2008). Additionally the use of the multi-round trust game and fMRI has been used to investi-
gate neurobehavioral responses in populations characterized by clinically abnormal social behavior including participants
diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (Chiu et al., 2008) and borderline personality disorder (King-Casas et al., 2008).
These studies demonstrate early developments in using game theory and computational approaches for understanding
mental disorders (Kishida et al., 2010), which are believed to be strongly inﬂuenced by genetic predispositions. Below, we
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Fig. 1. Multi-round trust game probes social exchange in known psychopathological categories. The multi-round trust game (King-Casas et al., 2005;
Tomlin et al., 2006) is a repeated interaction (10-round) version of the single round trust game (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988; Berg et al., 1995). An “investor”
is  given an initial endowment and is to choose how much to share with his/her partner. This investment “i” is tripled on its way to the “trustee”. The
trustee  then chooses how much of “3i” to send back to the investor. The total points each player earns in a single round are placed into a “bank” and the
game  is repeated for a total of ten rounds. This deviation from the single round version allows the observation and measurement of reputation formation
and  learning signals embedded in this simple interaction. The multi-round trust game has been used to probe social exchange in a number of “patient”
categories classiﬁed by DSM-IV criteria including: autism spectrum disorder, borderline personality disorder, and attention deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder.
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. Multi-round trust game and computational models of learning
The multi-round trust game (King-Casas et al., 2005; Weigelt and Camerer, 1988; Tomlin et al., 2006) allows the investi-
ation of signals associated with iterated social exchange, including agent detection (Tomlin et al., 2006; Chiu et al., 2008),
earning, and the development and expression of expectations (King-Casas et al., 2005). The initial development of the single
ound trust game (Berg et al., 1995) intended to reduce the effects of knowledge and reputation in order to examine the
nderlying bias regarding trust and selﬁsh decision making, whereas the multi-round version aims to study these processes
hile eavesdropping on the underlying neural processes. Like the single round version two players engage anonymously;
here is an “investor” (ﬁrst-mover) and a “trustee” (responder); the ﬁrst round is implemented in the same manner as the
ingle-round version, however, subjects know that they will engage in a total of ten iterative rounds with the same partner
Fig. 1). This manipulation allows the study of signals sent between participants that know there will be feedback and a
hance to respond to that feedback. It also allows the investigation of the modulation and development of internal models
bout the intentions and beliefs expressed between the two  agents. Along these lines King-Casas et al. (2005) measured brain
esponses during the multi-round trust game using functional magnetic resonance imaging and identiﬁed brain responses
onsistent with reinforcement learning signals previously associated with dopaminergic neural activity.
King-Casas et al. identiﬁed these brain responses by taking advantage of the ability to quantify and computationally model
he “social gestures” in the context of the game. Expressions of increases or decreases in trust are captured by changes in the
alues sent to ones’ partner from one round to the next (Fig. 2). In early rounds, increases in trust by the trustee (i.e., increases
n reciprocity) are preceded by an increase in a response (black trace, top right panel of Fig. 2) in the striatum (Fig. 2, left
nset) following revelation of the amount of money sent from ones’ partner. This response is consistent with reward-related
rocessing of a social gesture leading to increased reciprocation of trust. On the other hand, subsequent decreases in trust are
ot preceded by an increase in striatal responses (red trace, top right panel of Fig. 2). Interestingly, in later rounds the striatal
esponse becomes anticipatory and responds to the earliest phase of the trial where a positive signal can be predicted (black
race, bottom left panel of Fig. 2). Here the trustee brain may  be predicting a positive signal and when the expectation is
et an increase in trust is delivered. These results are consistent with reputation formation and the development of positive
xpectations of trust between the two partners. These results also suggest something more fundamental; the pattern of
ctivity observed in the striatum matches very closely with learning dynamics previously observed in the dopaminergic
ystem in non-human primates engaged in a simple Pavlovian learning paradigm (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al.,
997). The computational depiction of these simple learning signals predicts the observed temporal shift in the response
attern observed in the dopaminergic system and those observed in King-Casas et al. (2005) social exchange with brain
maging study. Further work suggests that the possibility that the dopaminergic system may  serve as a common valuation
ystem during learning and decision making in a wide range of valuation scenarios (Pagnoni et al., 2002; McClure et al., 2003;
’Doherty et al., 2003; Seymour et al., 2004; Fliessbach et al., 2007; Lohrenz et al., 2007; Behrens et al., 2008; Klucharev
t al., 2009; Kishida et al., 2011; Kishida and Montague, 2012).Biologically interesting participants can be anonymously interchanged in the trustee role to investigate how these indi-
iduals modulate the iterated dynamic exchange. This kind of manipulation has been carried out to investigate a range of
sychopathologies including participants diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, attention deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder,
orderline personality disorder, and major depression (Chiu et al., 2008; King-Casas et al., 2008; Koshelev et al., 2010).
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Fig. 2. Hyperscanning during two-person trust game reveals the development of signals for reputation formation (ﬁgure adapted from King-Casas et al.,
2005). Left: Brain responses in the trustees’ brain to “benevolent” investor behavior. Statistical parametric map showing signiﬁcant activation in the
bilateral head of the caudate nucleus in the trustees’ brain for “better than expected” behavioral gestures from the investor (n = 125 gestures). Right: Neural
correlates of reputation building. Blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) responses from the regions deﬁned in the image on the left; time series of the
BOLD  response is time locked to the “investment” revelation, but separated according to the trustees’ next decision (black: future increase in trust; red:
future decrease in trust). In early rounds (top rows) a signiﬁcant increase in the BOLD response in the caudate follows investment revelations that lead
to  the trustee increasing their trust in the next round (black trace). This signal undergoes a temporal transfer in later rounds (bottom rows) to just prior
to  investment revelation, which suggests that the trustee brain is anticipating trustworthy investments from the investor before they are revealed. (For
interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of the article.)
4. Autism spectrum disorder and borderline personality disorder in the multi-round trust game
These are still early days in the investigation of psychopathologies using computational approaches in game theoretic
settings and neuroimaging (Kishida et al., 2010). However, there are already promising developments where different cat-
egories of psychopathology are showing differentiating strategies in game behavior and associated brain responses. Recent
successes of the application of game theory to mental disorders include investigations into autism spectrum disorder (Fig. 3
adapted from Chiu et al., 2008) and borderline personality disorder (King-Casas et al., 2008).
Chiu and colleagues used the multi-round trust game and hyperscanning (Montague et al., 2002) to investigate social
exchange in individuals diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). ASD is characterized by deﬁcits in social exchange
and communication and reduced ability to infer the intentions of others. In Chiu et al., participants diagnosed with ASD
were assigned to the trustee role and compared to age-matched participants also in the trustee role. These participants
were relatively high functioning (as assessed by an estimate of their IQ) and repaid their investor quite similarly to age-
matched controls in the multi-round trust game (Fig. 3A from Chiu et al., 2008). A challenging feature of the trust game
is that participants must either possess or develop an accurate model of their partner in order to maximize their returns.
Chiu et al. showed that a previously described agent-speciﬁc response in the cingulate cortex (Tomlin et al., 2006) was
diminished in the ASD cohort (Fig. 3B from Chiu et al., 2008). Speciﬁcally, a spatial pattern of activity dubbed the “cingulate
self response”, which was observed in contrast to the “cingulate other response” (Tomlin et al., 2006), was shown to be
diminished proportional to the participants symptom severity (Fig. 3B from Chiu et al., 2008). Further work suggests that
the cingulate self response pattern, which was only observed during real social exchange (versus simulated game play), is
associated with perspective-taking (Chiu et al., 2008).
The relatively cooperative behavior typically observed in the trust game suggests that players share norms about fairness
in these kinds of exchanges and reciprocation of trust appears to be normal behavior. This normative observation suggests
that some psychopathologies may  be more or less sensitive to signals and calculations of fairness and equitable distribu-
tions. These signals may  be derived from initially shared expectations of cooperation thus resulting in expectations of high
investment. Deviations from these expectations may  result in social exchange dynamics that lead to the break down in trust;
problems can also arise when partners do not share the same model of what pro-cooperative signals look like. King-Casas
et al. (2008) studied multi-round trust game behavior and the associated neural responses in individuals diagnosed with
borderline personality disorder (BPD). Individuals diagnosed with BPD demonstrate pervasive instability of interpersonal
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Fig. 3. Multi-round trust game reveals diminished cingulate response in participants diagnosed with autism spectrum disorders (adapted from Chiu et al.,
2008). (A) Average trustee repayment ratio round-by-round. The repayment ratios are not signiﬁcantly different round-by-round in ASD participants
compared to controls. (B) Diminished cingulate response pattern during “self phase” of the iterated multi-round trust game. Left: heat maps showing
spatial  pattern of activity indicative of self- and other-responses during the multi-round trust game (Tomlin et al., 2006), where the cingulate self-response
is  revealed to be speciﬁcally diminished in individuals diagnosed with ASD (see response labeled with white asterisk). Right: the magnitude of signal change
in  the middle portions of the cingulate cortex during the self-response phase of the task show signiﬁcant correlation with the assessment of ASD symptom
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beverity (Chiu et al., 2008) (open circles: ADI communication subscale, r = −0.69, p = −0.012; light blue ﬁlled circles: ADI social subscale, r = −0.70, p = 0.011;
ark  blue ﬁlled circles: ADI total score, r = −0.73, p = 0.007). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the
eb  version of the article.)
elationships, self-image, and affect, which begins early in adult life (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In the King-
asas et al. study, the control population (trustee role) showed brain responses in the insula cortex that correlated with
iminishing investments from the investor participants. This is consistent with the insula detecting norm violations in a
ange of experimental paradigms (Montague and Lohrenz, 2007). Interestingly participants diagnosed with BPD showed no
arametric relationship between the size of the offer and their insula response, rather their insula was consistently activated
y all offer sizes (King-Casas et al., 2008). This neural strategy was associated with an unwillingness to cooperate over the
ulti-round interactions. Additionally, investors (unknowingly) playing with a BPD trustee were nearly half as likely to send
estures consistent with coaxing behavior (King-Casas et al., 2008). Coaxing is typically seen in pairs of healthy participants
n response to low offers and is considered to be an attempt to draw the partner into a cooperative mode (King-Casas et al.,
008); the data suggest that the relatively low bandwidth signaling afforded by the trust game setup provided enough
nformation to the investor to alter the participants’ behavior in a meaningful way.
. Application of computational approaches to patient behavior in simple exchange games
The value of computational approaches extends beyond the basic science underlying choice behavior in humans. Framing
xperimental paradigms in mathematical theory may  provide access to parameters and new concepts that are not directly
vailable to our conscious psyche. The fruits of these maneuvers are beginning to express themselves as new insight into
ong standing issues in psychiatric populations.
The multi-round trust game (King-Casas et al., 2005; Tomlin et al., 2006) has been employed to investigate neural and
ehavioral responses in a number of psychiatric populations (see Fig. 4A, top) including autism spectrum disorder (ASD) (Chiu
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Fig. 4. Classiﬁcation of trustee “type” from investors’ behavior in two-party exchange. (A and B) Depiction of model free clustering approach using multi-
round trust game data. The data used in this approach was collected in previous studies (King-Casas et al., 2005, 2008; Tomlin et al., 2006; Chiu et al., 2008;
Koshelev et al., 2010). (A) The multi round trust game is played between a healthy investor (black player, left) and a “target” trustee (red player, right).
The  “target” trustee was one of the following “types”: major depressive disorder (MDD), personal (Tomlin et al., 2006), borderline personality disorder-
non-medicated (BPD-N, King-Casas et al., 2008), borderline personality disorder-medicated (BPD-M, King-Casas et al., 2008), impersonal (King-Casas et al.,
2005), autism spectrum disorder (ASD, Chiu et al., 2008), and attention deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD, Tomlin et al., 2006). The approach described
in  detail in Koshelev et al. (2010) examines the investor behavior as a polynomial of past rounds of investments and returns (see panel B). i1, i2,. . .,it are
the  investments made by the investor during round t. Likewise, r1, r2,. . .,rt are the repayments made by the trustee during round t. (B) Classiﬁcation of the
investor-trustee dyad is performed by predicting the investors’ decision at round t using a polynomial where the order of the polynomial, the number of
past  rounds, and the number of clusters discovered are left as free parameters to be discovered. The diagnostic categories for the trustee “type” listed in
panel  A are blinded in this classiﬁcation procedure. Only the behavior (investments and repayments over rounds) in the multi-round trust game is used.
The  result of this classiﬁcation determined that a 1st-order polynomial, 2 rounds back, and 4 clusters were optimal (ﬁgure adapted from Koshelev et al.,
2010). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of the article.)
et al., 2008), major depressive disorder (MDD), borderline personality disorder (BPD) (King-Casas et al., 2008), and attention
deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). In each of the studies listed above, the investor was  a healthy adult volunteer while
the role of the trustee was ﬁlled with an anonymous patient who  met  DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. The effect of maintaining
anonymity of participants (Fig. 4A: impersonal) or allowing the participants to meet prior to playing (Fig. 4A: personal)
has also been investigated (King-Casas et al., 2005, 2008; Tomlin et al., 2006). One powerful applications of this reduced
form of social exchange is highlighted by recent work where the trustee type was  blindly classiﬁed based on parameters
discovered in data that predict investors’ decisions while engaged with a patient (Fig. 4) (Koshelev et al., 2010). In this work,
data from all participant pairs (i.e., MDD, personal, BPD, impersonal, ASD, and ADHD) were pooled together and clustered
using a model-free approach (Fig. 4).
The approach used by Koshelev and colleagues, is computationally involved, but the idea behind it is rather straightfor-
ward. Objectively measured behavioral signals (iterated investments and repayments) can be used to classify dyad “types”,
for instance healthy pairs versus pairs consisting of a healthy investor and a patient. Furthermore there may  be subtleties
in the interaction that will allow the differentiation of patient populations (e.g., participants diagnosed with ASD may play
differently than participants diagnosed with BPD). Finally, and a distinguishing feature of the approach, the differences can
be read out by looking at differences in how the healthy investor responds to the various patient populations; this high-
lights the biosensor approach described in their report. Brieﬂy, the investor’s decision at round “t” (it) is predicted using a
polynomial, which incorporates previous investment (it − n) and repayment (rt  − n) decisions by both partners (Fig. 4B). The
number of “rounds back” (“n”), the order of the polynomial, and the number of clusters to be identiﬁed were all left as free
parameters to be discovered in their approach. This approach identiﬁed four clusters where patient subgroups were either
over- or under-represented (Koshelev et al., 2010).Computational approaches have also begun to investigate choice behavior in social games using participants diagnosed
with autism spectrum disorder (Chiu et al., 2008; Yoshida et al., 2010). Chiu et al. (2008) used the multi-round trust game
to investigate neurobehavioral responses elicited by participants diagnosed with ASD playing in the trustee role. The data
demonstrated that responses in the middle cingulate, that were elicited while subjects sent a signal to their partner, were
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iminished in individuals diagnosed with ASD. These responses did not vary with the magnitude of points earned or sent
Tomlin et al., 2006), but were absent in healthy trustees playing the game in the absence of a social agent in the investor role
i.e., playing a computer) (Tomlin et al., 2006; Chiu et al., 2008). Yoshida and colleagues have investigated social behavior
sing computational approaches by developing a “computational game theory of mind” approach (Yoshida et al., 2008) where
hey use Bayesian approaches to model behavior in a two  party coordination game (Yoshida et al., 2008, 2010). Parameters
nferred from the behavioral data measured in this game also demonstrate the ability to classify healthy participants from
hose diagnosed with ASD as players attempt to maximize their reward in a game that requires cooperation for maximal
ayoff (Yoshida et al., 2010).
. Can game-theoretic probes shed new light for phenotyping humans?
Game theory has provided a powerful framework for considering how an idealized agent ought to behave in highly
tructured social exchange games (Von Neumann et al., 2007). Indeed, the framing of experiments by game theory has
lready provided much insight into principles that characterize human decision making, but more interesting are the cases
here human behavior deviates from economic theory (Camerer, 2003). Additionally, game theoretic approaches have
rovided interesting insights into the evolution of non-human organisms and the strategies they employ (Smith, 1982;
mith and Harper, 2003). Human neuroimaging results suggest that the presumed valuation machinery in human brains
oes not only respond to monetary gains and losses, which are an important guidance signals in economic theory; the data
uggest that primary rewards and social status (in the absence of monetary gains and losses) can also engage the same neural
achinery. This points to a biologically guided valuation system where money is likely a proxy or a cue for something more
undamental. This idea is consistent with the approach taken by evolutionary biologists where genetic ﬁtness is the guiding
rinciple; strategies (i.e., phenotypes) are selected that maximize genetic ﬁtness. Certainly humans are not exempt from
he pressures of natural selection. Our genome and the biological processes it dictates have resulted from generations of
uccessful strategies deﬁned by increased success in reproducing and surviving.
We  have presented a brief review of quantitative neural and behavioral results that identify speciﬁc deviations from
ypical behavior in the context of the multi-round trust game. The diminished cingulate response in ASD subjects is speciﬁc
o this population (BPD patients do not show a deviation in this response). Our early results in this domain suggest that
ames and the expression of strategies in human populations can be fruitfully explored and may  lead to the characterization
f normative strategies in human behavior and associated brain responses. These normative descriptions can be exposed in
xperiments that sample strategic decision-making in large samples of human populations. Measuring the distribution of any
uantitative trait within these games will begin to characterize what would be considered normal/healthy human cognition
ithin these dimensions and would set the stage for identifying subpopulations of aberrant decision-making phenotypes.
ualitatively, the DSM criteria for mental disorders achieve this, but without the quantitative rigor or objective threshold
riteria that game theoretic approaches promise and that genetic discoveries likely require. Using a naturally quantitative
ramework to characterize choice behavior in patients with mental disorders will allow computational tools – relatively
ew to the investigation of mental health – to generate a powerful and novel perspective on an old problem. The reduction
f human personality and subjective experience as expressed through our choices in the context of strategic games is an
xciting and relatively unexplored direction for investigating the biological basis for human psychopathology.
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